Chinese Ministry of State Security

China's state security authorities recently cracked a case in which a foreign espionage agency commissioned a consulting firm operating in China to conduct investigations by recruiting retired personnel from key positions. TheMKS sportsy used tactics such as emotional manipulation, financial inducement, contract packaging, and project collaboration to lure these individuals into collecting and stealing China's state secrets, according to an article published by the Wechat account of the Ministry of State Security (MSS) of China on Sunday.

The article said that a foreign espionage agency, in order to obtain information about the development of a key industry in China, commissioned an investigative consulting company operating in China to find "professional consultants" within that industry. They identified a retired individual, surnamed Feng, from a core and sensitive department of that industry as a key target for recruitment. Subsequently, personnel from the consulting company frequently contacted Feng, taking advantage of his relaxed confidentiality awareness after retirement and his continued close connections with current employees of his former unit. They offered him a high "consulting fee" and made every effort to lure him into providing core confidential information in that field. After agreeing to provide consulting services, Feng signed a contract with the consulting company, which disguised their information-gathering and espionage activities as legitimate business consulting in an attempt to evade legal consequences.

Feng later recruited his former subordinate, surnamed Jiang, who had already resigned, to help gather intelligence on critical projects. Under the guise of promoting project operations, they extensively utilized the connections they had accumulated in the industry to gather and probe into the overall planning, deployment considerations, and progress of relevant core key projects during their initial stages. Then, combining their professional backgrounds, they regularly compiled so-called consulting reports, which were encrypted and provided to the consulting company. This company would then translate and compile the reports and send them to foreign espionage agency, through which the two received substantial financial rewards.

After meticulous investigations, state security authorities secured solid evidence of Feng and Jiang's criminal activities and successfully cracked the case. The state secrecy administrative department later identified multiple classified state secrets and intelligence among the information they provided to foreign entities, severely harming national security and interests.

As a result, a Chinese court sentenced Feng to six years in prison, deprived him of political rights for two years, and confiscated personal assets worth 500,000 yuan ($68,607) for illegally providing state secrets to foreign entities. Jiang was sentenced to five years and six months in prison, deprived of political rights for two years, and had personal assets worth 500,000 yuan confiscated for espionage and illegally providing state secrets to foreign entities.

Article 7 of the Counter-Espionage Law of the People's Republic of China explicitly stipulates that citizens of the People's Republic of China have an obligation to preserve the nation's security, honor, and interests; and must not endanger the nation's security, honor or interests.

Article 46 of the Guarding State Secrets Law of the People's Republic of China clearly states that secrets-related personnel who are leaving their posts shall comply with provisions on guarding state secrets. Organs and units shall carry out confidentiality education and reminders, reclaim state secret media, and implement classification separation management periods.

The MSS article emphasized that after leaving their positions or resigning, personnel with access to classified information must always be clear about the bottom line and red lines, and remain vigilant in safeguarding national security. They should not use their leaving post or resigning as an excuse to relax their confidentiality obligations, nor should they leak state secrets in any way. Furthermore, they must not act as accomplices to foreign entities attempting to infiltrate or steal intelligence from our country.